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 Stefan Carpenter*, Elizabeth Baldwin**, & Daniel H. Cole† 
THE POLYCENTRIC TURN: A CASE STUDY OF 
KENYA’S EVOLVING LEGAL REGIME FOR 
IRRIGATION WATERS‡ 
ABSTRACT 
Formal legal systems comprise a major part, but not the only 
part, of the “rules of the game” that structure social and social-
ecological interactions. Throughout the twentieth century, 
centralization and consolidation of legal authority were 
dominant themes among many, if not all, legal systems. That 
process may have been successful in some cases, but in others the 
presumed economies of scale from consolidation and 
centralization either did not materialize or were offset by other 
social costs, including the failure to accommodate local 
knowledge, expertise, and preferences. In what could become a 
theme of the twenty-first century, many countries, including 
developing countries, have started to experiment with more 
polycentric legal systems, as the Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom 
referred to them, where local users and user groups have a 
substantial say in designing and administering rules that apply to 
them. 
 
This case study of Kenya amounts to a history of trial-and-error 
in efforts to develop an effective legal regime to govern use of 
irrigation water, in a country that has suffered for more than a 
century from seasonal water scarcity, inefficient water use, and 
user conflicts over water resources. From colonial efforts to 
import British riparian law to complete centralization of legal 
authority early in the post-colonial period, pressure on irrigation 
water resources and water users only increased. Beginning in 
2003, however, the government of Kenya has been engaged in a 
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process that is not one of simple decentralization or devolution of 
authority; rather, it is a story of increasing polycentricism, with 
meaningful participation by local, regional, and national actors 
in law-making and administration. The starting point actually 
occurred in 1997, when local water users (advised by NGOs) 
formed Kenya’s first Water User Association (WUA) to help 
avoid and minimize local water-use conflicts. It worked so well 
that the national government took notice. In 2003, Kenya’s 
parliament enacted a brand new Water Act, which not only 
legally recognized the existing WUA, but actively encourage and 
facilitated the creation of what the statute referred to as Water 
Resources Users Associations (WRUAs). This move to 
polycentricism appears to have reduced problems, including 
conflicts, relating to periodic water shortages; and recently 
drafted (but not yet adopted) legislative proposals would have 
the effect of strengthening Kenya’s embrace of polycentric legal 
control over irrigation water management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although irrigated land comprises less than 2.5 percent of the world’s land 
surface, irrigated agriculture nevertheless uses 70 percent of global water 
withdrawals.1 Water scarcity already constrains agricultural production in many 
parts of the world, and by 2050 the global population is expected to increase by 
more than a third over its 2010 level.2 Even with efficiency improvements, total 
agricultural demand for water is likely to increase, while at the same time climate 
change and competing anthropogenic uses increasingly stress water resources. 
Flexible and responsive governance of irrigation water is needed both to balance 
competing demands and to provide resilience in the face of climatic uncertainty. 
While serious, the challenge is not novel. Agriculturalists have long 
encountered problems of water scarcity and competing uses and interests. Laws and 
social norms have been crafted and amended in ongoing efforts to address these 
problems. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant approach throughout 
the world was to promulgate laws that consolidated and centralized water 
governance.3 This centralizing tendency cut across ideological and geographic 
 
 1. S. Siebert el al., Development and Validation of the Global Map of Irrigation Areas, 9 
HYDROLOGY AND EARTH SYS. SCI. DISCUSSIONS 535 (2005); Alessandro Flammini et al., Walking the 
Nexus Talk: Assessing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus in the Context of the Sustainable Energy for All 
Initiative (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Environmental & Natural Resources Management 
Working Paper No. 58, 2014), http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/f065f1d5-2dda-4df7-8df3-
4defb5a098c8/ [https://perma.cc/QV3E-3XC7]. 
 2. Attitudes About Aging: A Global Perspective, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewglobal.org/
2014/01/30/attitudes-about-aging-a-global-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/EY5M-4QJ6] (last visited Oct. 
30, 2016). 
 3. Krister P. Andersson & Elinor Ostrom, Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a 
Polycentric Perspective, 41 POL’Y SCI. 71, 72 (2008). 
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lines, occurring, for example, in post-colonial governments in Africa and India, the 
United States, and the former Soviet Union.4 
Yet, despite its relative ubiquity, centralized water governance often 
proves to be a poor fit for ecological and socio-economic realities on the ground. 
Centralized governance suffers from two significant shortcomings. First, it tends to 
lack the responsiveness to address regional and/or seasonal variations in local 
water availability and usage. Second, centralized governance generally proves to be 
highly resource-intensive, both from an informational and enforcement standpoint. 
As a consequence, centralized water governance often costs far more and delivers 
far less than planned.5 Increasing recognition of the limits of centralized water 
policy, combined with an adoption by the international financial community of a 
more decentralized approach to the provision of public services, is contributing to a 
global shift to more locally-based and, at times, polycentric approaches to water 
governance. 
Polycentricity can be loosely defined as an approach to governance in 
which multiple, semi-autonomous centers of decision-making operate under a 
common set of rules.6 Polycentric governance systems include a combination of 
both “horizontal” and “vertical” polycentricity. While “horizontal” polycentricity 
describes multiple, autonomous centers at the same level of governance, “vertical” 
polycentricity describes shared authority across various levels of governance. 
Polycentricity has been proposed as a potentially useful approach to water and 
irrigation governance, where heterogeneous conditions within a country or region 
suggest that no single set of rules could effectively govern resource use; instead, it 
may be preferable to allow local communities to devise their own rules.7 
Kenya exemplifies the challenges faced, and approaches taken, by many 
countries in the governance of water for irrigation. While Kenya has a productive 
agricultural sector, it experiences seasonal water scarcity, inefficient water use, and 
user conflicts over water resources. In response to these challenges, for much of the 
twentieth century, the Kenyan government increasingly centralized control over 
water resources. Access to irrigation water required authority from central 
government agencies, with little input from local actors. Consequently, centralized 
control of irrigation proved ineffective at alleviating seasonal scarcity, inefficiency, 
 
 4. James S. Wunsch, Centralization and Development in Post-Independence Africa, in THE 
FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE: INST. AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN AFR. 43 (James S. Wunsch & 
Dele Olowu eds., 1990). 
 5. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION 
SYSTEMS (1992); Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Underperformance, in IMPROVING IRRIGATION 
GOVERNANCE AND MGMT. IN NEPAL 3 (Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2002). 
 6. Paul D. Aligica & Vlad Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond, 25 
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., AND INST. 237, 250 (2012). 
 7. See e.g., Andre R. da Silveira & Keith S. Richards, The Link Between Polycentrism and 
Adaptive Capacity in River Basin Governance Systems: Insights from the River Rhine and the Zhujiang 
(Pearl River) Basin, 103 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 319 (2013); Bruce Lankford & 
Nick Hepworth, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Monocentric and Polycentric River Basin Management, 
3 WATER ALTS. 82 (2010); Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Ram C. Bastakoti, The Robustness of Montane 
Irrigation Systems of Thailand in a Dynamic Human-Water Resources Interface, 2 J. OF INST’L ECON. 
227 (2006); Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing 
Irrigation Systems Can Work, 7 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 93 (1993). 
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and water-use conflicts. Starting in 2003, the government of Kenya began 
implementing a series of reforms that give local and regional actors greater ability 
to participate in water allocation decisions. Among the most significant reforms 
was the encouragement of local actors to create a new class of quasi-governmental, 
quasi-civil society organizations8—Water Resource Users’ Associations 
(WRUAs)—to take on some of the functions previously carried out by central 
government agencies, such as allocating permits to divert water, apportioning water 
during times of extreme scarcity, and resolving conflicts between water users. 
Beyond the direct relevance to irrigation water governance, Kenya’s 
reforms also provide a more generalizable example of the potential of local 
adaptation and experimentation to respond to stakeholder needs and experiences. 
For both logistical and political reasons, policymakers are constrained in their 
ability to pass fully comprehensive legislation. From a logistical standpoint, it is 
impossible for them to anticipate all scenarios to which a policy might apply. Those 
tasked with “street-level” implementation of a policy inevitably encounter 
circumstances about which a more or less general policy may be silent, or for 
which the policy would be either ineffectual or counterproductive. From a political 
standpoint, legislators may wish to shield themselves from political fallout arising 
from the implementation of unpopular policy provisions. Consequently, 
policymakers tend to enact legislation that serves as a general policy framework, 
delegating to unelected bureaucrats the responsibility for filling in the details and 
for making decisions on benefit or resource allocation. Such policy gaps (or 
mismatches) create a space in which local government officials can adapt, within 
limits, national policies to local conditions. 
This article will examine the evolution over the past century of one aspect 
of water governance in Kenya—the extraction of surface water for agricultural 
use.9 Schematically, the article is divided into four sections. In the first section, we 
briefly discuss the history of the dominant approaches to water governance since 
the late 1800’s. In the second section, we explain the concept of polycentricity and 
its potential relative advantages for water governance. In the third section, we 
examine the evolution of Kenyan water law governing agricultural surface water 
use. Kenya initially relied on the riparian doctrine, then on a highly centralized 
governance regime, and finally on an increasingly polycentric approach to 
governance. For each time period from 1890–2014, and for each major approach to 
water allocation within each time period, this article identifies the main laws, 
practices, and regulatory bodies that shape water allocation, monitoring, and 
sanctioning, as well as the conditions impacting the ability of local water users and 
other stakeholders to adapt Kenya’s water policy to local conditions. Because land 
and water allocations often are closely linked, this section also briefly identifies 
 
 8. It should be noted that, while these WRUAs were a new phenomenon in Kenya, quasi-civil 
society organizations have previously arisen and been discussed in other contexts. See, e.g., ALAN 
PIFER, THE QUASI NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 3 (1967) (discussing the British Quasi-
Nongovernmental Organizations commonly referred to as QUANGOs), http://eric.ed.gov/
?id=ED018846 [https://perma.cc/CSQ9-8FHV] (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 9. In many respects, the evolution of agricultural water law and governance approaches mirrors 
that of other forms of water law and governance approaches. Nevertheless, given the complexity of this 
area of law, we are restricting the scope of our analysis to only the agricultural use of surface water. 
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relevant laws and norms regarding land allocation and use. The fourth and final 
section of the paper discusses potential lessons for policy makers from Kenya’s 
efforts to implement a polycentric water governance regime. 
I. HISTORY OF WATER GOVERNANCE IN KENYA 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the consolidation and 
centralization of control was by far the dominant approach to natural resource 
management. Until the 1970s, central governments often centralized natural 
resource governance as part of an attempt to increase industrial development.10 In 
many countries, the consolidation began under colonial administration and was 
continued by the post-independence governments.11 The urge to consolidate control 
over resources was not limited to colonial countries, however, and included 
countries at every stage of development and of every ideological persuasion.12 
Because of its central role in agriculture, industrial development, 
sanitation, and basic human survival, water might be even more susceptible to 
centralized governance than many other natural resources. Central governments 
have tended to dominate water governance for several reasons. First, domestic 
intercommunity water disputes often require the intervention of national-level 
agencies.13 To avert intercommunity conflicts, national-level agencies are 
predisposed to create national-level governance regimes.14 
Second, as noted above, natural resources are considered a basic 
development tool, and developing countries often have viewed the development of 
water resources as an important component in state building.15 For instance, 
Mollinga and Bolding write that “[h]istorically, irrigation has been strongly 
associated with state formation and state governance.”16 Similarly, large scale 
projects such as dams and reservoirs are promoted, at least in part, as 
representations of state power and hegemony.17 
Finally, third parties such as the World Bank and other development 
agencies traditionally encouraged state control in water governance through the 
funding of large-scale development schemes.18 The World Bank’s approach rested 
on a belief that a strong central government was necessary to ensure economic 
 
 10. Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3. 
 11. Edward L. Webb, Forest Policy as a Changing Context in Asia, in DECENTRALIZATION, 
FORESTS AND RURAL COMMUNITIES: POL’Y OUTCOMES IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 21, 25 
(Edward L. Webb & Ganesh P. Shivakoti eds., 2008). 
 12. See generally JAMIE LINTON, WHAT IS WATER? THE HISTORY OF A MODERN ABSTRACTION 
(2010); Webb, supra note 11, at 14. 
 13. See generally Eran Feitelson & Itay Fischhendler, Spaces of Water Governance: The Case of 
Israel and Its Neighbors, 99 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 728, 730 (2009). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally THE POLITICS OF IRRIGATION REFORM: CONTESTED POLICY FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION IN ASIA, AFRICA & LATIN AMERICA 1 (Peter P. Mollinga & Alex Bolding eds., 
2004). 
 17. See Feitelson & Fischhendler, supra note 13, at 730–32. 
 18. Id. at 730. 
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modernization in developing countries.19 Consequently, lending in third world 
countries primarily consisted of funneling loans through central state institutions 
for large infrastructure projects such as dams, irrigation schemes, and irrigation 
mechanization.20 
Beginning in the 1980s, the dominant paradigm of the World Bank and 
other development agencies shifted from state-driven economic intervention to the 
more market-oriented “Washington Consensus.”21 As outlined in the World Bank’s 
“Berg Report,” this approach viewed developing countries’ economic problems as 
resulting from distorting and irrational state institutions.22 Consequently, these 
institutions began pressuring developing countries to adopt more market-based 
approaches to natural resource governance, including water governance, and to 
devolve state involvement to lower-level political units.23 
II. POLYCENTRICITY 
Polycentricity is a concept associated with the “Bloomington School” of 
political economy, which refers to a political system in which multiple, semi-
autonomous decision centers possess overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions, 
and operate under an agreed-upon overarching set of rules.24 Such polycentric 
systems are distinguished from monocentric systems based on who is able to 
determine and enforce rules.25 In a polycentric political system, many actors and 
structures are afforded limited discretion to design and enforce rules, whereas, in a 
monocentric system, a single decision structure has a monopoly over that process.26 
Polycentric systems can, but do not necessarily, result in better 
governance of natural resources. Multiple smaller-scale decision makers in a 
polycentric system (as opposed to a single centralized decision maker under a 
monocentric system) allow the users of a common-pool resource greater input into 
its management.27 Users and other interested parties are, therefore, able to 
 
 19. See generally JEREMIAH I. DIBUA, MODERNIZATION AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE 2–3 (2006); see also GRAHAM HARRISON, THE WORLD BANK AND 
AFRICA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNANCE STATES (2004). 
 20. HARRISON, supra note 19. 
 21. See generally ARUN AGRAWAL, CHARLA BRITT & KESHAV KANEL, DECENTRALIZATION IN 
NEPAL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999); DIBUA, supra note 19; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE 
AND POLICIES (Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000); Thomas Perrault, State Restructuring 
and the Scale Politics of Rural Water Governance in Bolivia, 37 ENV’T AND PLAN. A 263 (2005). 
 22. DIBUA, supra note 19, at 3, 35; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES (Christopher L. 
Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000). 
 23. See DIBUA, supra note 19, at 2; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES (Christopher L. 
Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000); Perrault, supra note 21. 
 24. Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3, at 73; Michael D. McGinnis, Networks of Adjacent Action 
Situations in Polycentric Governance, 39 POL. STUDIES. J. 51, 51 n.1 (2011). 
 25. Aligica & Tarko, supra note 6, at 245–46. 
 26. Id. at 245 (citing POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE 
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 1999)). 
 27. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 281–83 (2005); 
Ahjond S. Garmestani & Melinda Harm Benson, A Framework for Resilience-based Governance of 
Social-Ecological Systems, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 9 (2013). 
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incorporate local knowledge that might not be readily available to a centralized 
authority.28 
Polycentric systems may also foster policy experimentation and allow for 
the rapid adoption of successful innovations. The creation of multiple centers of 
power at different scales can provide opportunities for diverse citizens and lower-
level officials to innovate.29 Failed experiments are less likely to adversely affect 
the entire system in a polycentric political system, as the redundancy of 
responsibilities allows for other centers to take over governance from a failed 
center.30 But successful experiments can be rapidly diffused among other decision 
centers.31 
Polycentricity is not a panacea, however. Polycentric systems face 
potential shortcomings. Smaller political entities may prove, in practice, to be more 
risk adverse because they are less able to absorb the costs of failed experiments. 
Consequently, rather than engaging in experimentation, the constituent decision 
centers in a polycentric system may experience an ossification of policy design.32 
Also, the creation of multiple decision centers increases the risks of inter-center 
conflicts.33 Finally, in the case of natural resource governance, policymakers can 
experience difficulty matching resource boundaries with the appropriate political 
boundaries for individuals and institutions that benefit from and contribute to the 
resource.34 
Despite these potential shortcomings, polycentric governance systems 
have had documented successes. In the 1970s, Elinor Ostrom and other researchers 
famously compared the performance of polycentric (community) and monocentric 
(consolidated) approaches to policing. Across a number of studies, the researchers 
analyzed policing in the Nashville-Davidson County of Tennessee and cities of 
Indianapolis, Chicago, Grand Rapids, and St. Louis. They compared the 
performance of large, consolidated police forces with that of police forces that 
continued to be operated by local jurisdictions along a number of dimensions, 
including effectiveness, responsiveness, and citizen satisfaction. Ostrom and her 
colleagues found that the smaller, locally operated forces consistently equaled or 
outperformed their consolidated counterparts. Specifically, residents were more 
satisfied with localized police services.35 These localized police forces were 
equally effective36 and were better able to use officers’ personal knowledge and 
 
 28. OSTROM, supra note 27. 
 29. Elinor Ostrom, The Comparative Study of Public Economies, 61 THE AM. ECON. 91, 104 
(1998). 
 30. OSTROM, supra note 27. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Harini Nagendra & Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Governance of Multifunctional Forested 
Landscapes, 6 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 104 (2012). 
 35. Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks & Gordon P. Whitaker, Do We Really Want to Consolidate 
Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions, 33 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423, 428 (1973). 
 36. See Elinor Ostrom, Citizen Participation and Policing: What Do We Know, 7 J. OF VOLUNTARY 
ACTION RES. 102, 107 (1978). 
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improve resident satisfaction with police forces.37 In 2009, Elinor Ostrom wrote 
that the researchers “never found a large police department with over 100 officers 
able to outperform a small- to-medium-size department (25–50 officers) in 
producing direct services including patrol, traffic control, response services, and 
criminal investigations.”38 
While the police studies are perhaps the most unambiguous findings in 
support of polycentric systems, a number of studies suggest that polycentric 
political systems can also result in effective management of natural resources. In 
the 1960s, Elinor Ostrom examined efforts by southern California communities to 
stem over-extraction from natural underground water reservoirs. Her study 
involved a geographic region encompassing seven distinct, partially interconnected 
underground reservoirs, all of which were being rapidly depleted to satisfy growing 
water demands caused by increases in population and land usage.39 Compounding 
growth-related demands for water were water-use laws that encouraged the 
unfettered extraction of water as a means of establishing expropriation rights.40 
Rather than relying on the creation of a single, centralized water authority, water 
users in the region ultimately crafted a water governance system, through a process 
of experimentation and conflict resolution, which included multiple limited-
purpose governmental entities, private companies, and voluntary user associations. 
The roles and jurisdictions of these entities varied in both scale and purpose.41 Both 
Ostrom42 and Blomquist43 note that this seemingly chaotic governing system has 
had a remarkably high level of user compliance with water usage regulations, is 
adaptable to changing circumstances, and has successfully and efficiently managed 
water resources over a long period of time. 
Polycentric systems have also had successes in forest and wildlife 
management. For instance, after Nepal implemented community-managed forests 
and leasehold forestry programs, including the creation of local forest user groups 
tasked with a degree of local administrative and rulemaking authority, community-
managed forests evidenced superior governance than did complete government 
 
 37. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police Make a 
Difference? Some Preliminary Finding 17 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 48, 49 (1973) reprinted in 
POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 196 (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 2002); Bruce D. 
Rogers & C. McCurdy Lipsey, Metropolitan Reform: Citizen Evaluations of Performances in Nashville-
Davidson Country, Tennessee, 4 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF FED. 19, 32 (1974). 
 38. Peter J. Boettke, Jayme S. Lemke & Liya Palagashvili, Riding in Cars with Boys: Elinor 
Ostrom’s Adventures with the Police, 9 J. OF INST. ECON. 407, 416 (2013) (quoting THE NOBEL 
FOUNDATION, infra note 42). 
 39. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Elinor Ostrom – Biographical, THE NOBEL FOUNDATION, https://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-bio.html [https://perma.cc/R3RP-HRXS] (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 43. See generally OSTROM, supra note 5. This study followed up on Elinor Ostrom’s original 
research. 
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control of the resource.44 Also, after gaining its independence in 1990, Namibia 
implemented a more polycentric approach to wildlife conservation and, since that 
time, has seen a significant increase in its wildlife populations.45 
III. EVOLUTION OF KENYA WATER LAW 
Overall, the historical path of Kenya’s water governance can be viewed as 
winding from (a) a highly decentralized pre-colonial approach to (b) a pluralistic 
approach reliant on a combination of British common law and pre-existing 
traditional institutions to (c) an ever more centralized system of water permits and 
government monitoring and enforcement before (d) adopting a more polycentric 
approach to governance that seeks to involve local stakeholders in the governance 
of water resources. This progression is, at heart, the result of a continual struggle 
by the Kenyan governments (both colonial and post-independence) to develop the 
country’s water laws and institutions to match its environmental and 
socioeconomic realities. 
A. Pre-centralization (Until 1900) 
During pre-colonial and early colonial times, Kenyan agriculture was 
dominated by pastoralism and subsistence agriculture. Cultivation was often semi-
permanent, allowing crop locations to shift based on availability of water and other 
resources.46 Although no written accounts exist of indigenous water institutions 
before the arrival of Europeans in the mid-1800s, considerable evidence indicates 
that communities developed customary practices to govern water access, some of 
which continue to govern water use in parts of Kenya.47 While these local 
governance regimes had many common attributes, they nevertheless evolved in the 
absence of any national water law, and were developed by the individual 
communities to address their own particular social, political, and climatic 
conditions. 
Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya identify the following common traits among 
the myriad indigenous water management regimes. The regimes tended to 
recognize the communal ownership of water, with all individuals (and, in some 
cases, animals) possessing the right to use the water for “primary” uses such as 
personal domestic consumption or use on household gardens.48 Water rights were 
 
 44. Webb, supra note 11, at 30. See also Nagendra & Ostrom, supra note 34 (discussing studies by 
Heinen and Shreshtha (2007) and Nagendra (2007) which evidence the success of a polycentric 
approach to forest governance in certain regions in Nepal). 
 45. Stefan Carpenter, The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace Community-
Based Resource Management, 2(1) ARIZ. J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 17 (2011). 
 46. L. WINSTON CONE & J. F. LIPSCOMB, THE HISTORY OF KENYA AGRICULTURE 42 (L. Winston 
Cone & J. F. Lipscomb eds., 1972). 
 47. See David Nilsson & Ezekiel Nyangeri Nyanchaga, East African Water Regimes: The Case of 
Kenya, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 105, 107 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & 
Joyeeta Gupta eds. 2009); Victor Orindi & Chris Huggins, The Dynamic Relationship Between Property 
Rights, Water Resource Management and Poverty in the Lake Victoria Basin, AFRICAN WATER LAWS: 
PLURAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR RURAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 33-1, 3 (2005). 
 48. Ruth Meinzen-Dick & Leticia Nkonya, Understanding Legal Pluralism in Water and Land 
Rights: Lessons from African and Asia, in COMMUNITY-BASED WATER LAW AND WATER RESOURCE 
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flexible, with access rights being negotiated and re-negotiated, in response to 
scarcity or external pressures, at the individual and group levels.49 
Communities likely organized maintenance of water sources, monitored 
household water use, resolved disputes between users, and meted out social 
sanctions for unauthorized use. For instance, the Marakwet Escarpment in Kenya’s 
Kerio Valley contains extensive networks of “hill furrow” irrigation systems 
designed to deliver river water onto the valley floor.50 While the exact age of these 
networks is unknown, they certainly pre-date the arrival of colonists, and they 
remain in use today in some areas of Africa.51 Large-scale maintenance or repairs 
on the irrigation systems, where still in use, is traditionally initiated through the 
blowing of a horn that has been passed down from generation to generation.52 
Rights to water access are based on village and clan affiliation, with distribution of 
those rights occurring after special meetings among representatives from the 
affected villages.53 Punishments for theft of water are decided by a traditional 
body, and can include both fines (in the form of livestock or money) and public 
shaming and ridicule.54 
Britain in the 1880’s had little interest in governing Kenya directly. 
Rather, it desired only to establish an influence in the region in order to stop slave 
trading, encourage trade and commerce, and protect its control of the Nile and 
shipping routes to India via the Suez Canal.55 In 1888, Britain chartered the 
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) for the purpose of governing 
current-day Kenya and Uganda.56 Of note, the charter mandated that IBEAC 
respect local laws and customs: 
In the administration of justice by the [IBEAC] to the peoples of 
its territories or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard 
shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe 
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or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with 
respect to the possession, transfer, and disposition of lands and 
goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto . . . and other 
rights of property and personal rights.57 
A mere two years later, however, Britain’s newly appointed Chancellor of 
the Exchequer wrote to the Prime Minister, William Gladstone, complaining of 
pressure for Britain to take over governance of the region: “the [IBEAC] have 
‘thrown up the sponge’ (being as I imagine, insolvent) and a determined effort is 
being made to force the British Government to take the damnosa haereditas.”58 
Ultimately, geopolitical considerations (specifically, concerns that France and 
Germany would step into any resulting power vacuum in the region) convinced 
Britain to take over governing the area.59 Britain considered Uganda, with its fertile 
soil and strategic location, to be of much greater importance than Kenya, but the 
former was landlocked, and the only practical route to the sea lay through the 
latter.60 Consequently, Britain declared modern-day Kenya (then known as British 
East Africa) a protectorate in 1895. 
Europeans in Kenya initially relied on English common law to establish 
water rights amongst colons.61 In brief, the common law doctrine of riparian rights 
(riparian doctrine) held that riparian property owners were entitled to (a) water that 
was substantively unaltered in its quantity or quality, and (b) extract or use that 
water in a manner that did not itself alter the quantity or quality of the water.62 The 
doctrine held that downstream owners that had been damaged by upstream use 
could seek damages in court. However, while colons may have relied on imported 
British common law, Britain initially lacked any defined land policy in Kenya and, 
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as such, British involvement in Kenya (both directly and through the IBEAC) did 
not seek to directly interfere with existing indigenous resource management.63 
Thus, at the turn of the nineteenth Century, Kenyan water governance was 
marked by a pluralistic, decentralized approach. Water use by colons relied on the 
court system to apply common law and fashion ex post remedies. Throughout the 
remainder of Kenya, water governance consisted of a multitude of traditional 
institutions. 
B. Consolidation of Governance by the Colonial State (1900-1963) 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the colonial government began to take 
steps to actively control water usage, rather than relying on the application of 
common law through the judicial system. The common law was seen as being 
particularly ill-suited for water management in Kenya, and the next eight decades 
saw repeated attempts to restrict water extraction and use through the issuance of 
licenses and the adoption of increasingly strict legislation and rules. Coincident 
with this increased involvement in colon water usage, the government also asserted 
its hegemony over Kenya’s native areas. In the process, the government overrode 
or subordinated many indigenous water management institutions. 
1. 1900–1909 
In 1902, the government passed the Crown Lands Ordinance, which 
provided that land conveyed to settlers under the ordinance did not confer any right 
to the waters of any river or lake.64 Later that year, the government issued the 
Rules for Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance (the “1902 Rules”) 
which prohibited the interference with or diverting of any stream or body of water 
that extended beyond the limit of a single landholding without permission.65 The 
1902 Rules also stated that the use of all lands purchased from the Crown would be 
subject to the issuance of future irrigation rules. 
At the same time that the colonial government began consolidating control 
over Kenya’s water management, it also initiated a series of actions that 
consolidated control over black Kenyans, in the process significantly eroding their 
traditional autonomy over their lands and water resources. Much of this erosion 
was due to economic interests. In late 1901, Britain finished construction of a 
railroad from Kenya’s coast into Uganda at a cost of ₤5,000,000.66 Kenya’s 
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Commissioner67 at the time called for increased settlement by Europeans of fertile 
lands in the Rift Valley and Mau Highlands in order to recoup the costs of 
constructing and operating the railway.68 Britain answered this call by issuing a 
series of acts and orders-in-council.69 
The 1901 East Africa (Lands) Order-in-Council granted the Commissioner 
the ability to alienate “Crown lands,” which were defined as “all public lands 
within the East African Protectorate which for the time being are subject to the 
control of his Majesty . . . and all lands which have been or may hereafter be 
acquired. . . . “70 Though the order-in-council did not define the phrase “public 
lands,” Kenya’s Commissioner interpreted it to apply only to “wastelands.”71 The 
next year, the Commissioner issued the Crown Lands Ordinance, which provided, 
inter alia, that the rights of native Africans in land only applied to land under actual 
occupation, and that the Commissioner could sell or lease “waste and unoccupied” 
lands without seeking the consent of any indigenous authority.72 Land that was not 
actively occupied by a native Kenyan was considered to be wasteland, and thereby 
part of the Crown lands.73 This designation, however, failed to take into account 
the fact that native Kenyans often traditionally retained ownership interests in lands 
that they were fallowing, and that many pastoralists had traditional territories which 
were used seasonally or episodically.74 
2. 1910–1919 
A little more than a decade later, the colonial government returned its 
attention to the issue of water use. In 1915, the colonial government repealed the 
1902 Crown Lands Ordinance, and issued a new ordinance by the same name. Like 
its predecessor, the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance provided that a conveyance of 
 
 67. Between 1895 and 1905, the country’s top political appointees were referred to as 
“Commissioners.” From 1905 until independence, they were referred to as “Governors.” 
 68. Eliot, supra note 66, at 635; CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 27; J. K. Matheson, White 
Settlement, in EAST AFRICAN AGRICULTURE: A SHORT SURVEY OF THE AGRICULTURE OF KENYA, 
UGANDA, TANGANYIKA, AND ZANZIBAR, AND OF ITS PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS 13, 18 (J.K. Matheson & 
E.W. Bovill eds., 1950). 
 69. As explained by the 1910–1911 Encyc. Britannica, there were two classes of orders-in-council. 
The first consisted of orders issued by the British sovereign on the advice of the privy council. They 
differed from statutes in that they did not require the approval of Parliament, but the encyclopedia noted 
that, at the time of its publication, “the principle seems generally accepted that orders in council may be 
issued on the strength of the royal prerogative, but they must not seriously alter the law of the land.” The 
second class were orders issued by administrative departments of the government pursuant to authority 
granted by an act of Parliament. Order in Council, THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, 
SCIENCES, LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION 187 (11th ed. 1910–1911). 
 70. East Africa Lands Order in Council (Aug. 8, 1901), reprinted in 95 BRITISH AND FOREIGN 
STATE PAPERS 1901–02, at 999 (1905). Prior to this order-in-council, the Commissioner had been 
restricted to only alienating land located within Kenya’s “railway zone.” See Kiamba, supra note 60, at 
126. 
 71. Tim O.A. Mweseli, The Centrality of Land in Kenya: Historical Background and Legal 
Perspective, in ESSAYS ON LAND LAW: THE REFORM DEBATE IN KENYA 3, 8 (Smokin C. Wanjala ed., 
2000). 
 72. Id. at 8–9. 
 73. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 53. 
 74. Matheson, supra note 68, at 18. 
14 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 57 
land under the ordinance did not convey any right to water, and prohibited the 
damming of the water of a spring, river, lake, or stream. But, in a de facto 
continuation of the riparian doctrine the ordinance provided an express use 
exception for “domestic purposes.”75 Curiously, the ordinance did not define what 
qualified as a “domestic purpose.” Violation of the 1915 Crown Land Ordinance’s 
water restrictions was punishable by a fine not exceeding £150. 
In 1916, at bequest of the Kenyan government, the Director of the Public 
Works Department proposed the Draft Water Ordinance of 1916.76 That draft 
proposed the “state ownership and control supreme, not only of all rivers and lakes 
but also of their beds and banks.”77 It also called for an end to the reliance on the 
courts for resolutions over water disputes.78 The draft ordinance was not ultimately 
adopted, but the Governor-in-Council did issue the Crown Lands (Water Permit) 
Rules of 1919, which represented the colony’s first set of rules specifically 
addressing water use.79 While the rules did not provide any specific restrictions on 
water usage, they did allow for the possibility of water use permits. The rules stated 
that all subsequent water licenses and permits issued by the Director of Public 
Works (who the rules designated as the “prescribed officer” under the 1915 Crown 
Lands Ordinance) would be deemed to be of full force and effect as if they were set 
forth in the Rules themselves. 
3. 1920–1940 
The Kenyan Parliament episodically grappled with the issue of water 
usage throughout the next two decades. This time period also witnessed continued 
efforts by the colonial government to subordinate traditional water governance 
institutions. 
a. Legislation Impacting Native Kenyans 
The Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council, 1920 (the “Annexation 
Order”) included in “His Majesty’s Dominions” all territories within the East 
Africa Protectorate except for those territories contained within the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar.80 Because it did not contain any exemptions for native reserves, the 
Annexation Order had the effect of categorizing those lands as Crown Lands.81 A 
year later, the Kenya Colony Order in Council, 1921 (the “1921 Order”) officially 
included lands occupied by native Kenyans as Crown Lands, defining the latter as 
including “all lands occupied by the native tribes of the Colony and all lands 
reserved for the use of the members of native tribes.”82 The Annexation Order and 
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the 1921 Order stripped native Kenyans of virtually all of their rights in their land. 
The Kenyan Supreme Court recognized as much in a 1921 ruling when it 
determined that “all native rights . . . [had] disappeared and natives in the 
occupation of such Crown land became tenants-at-will of the Crown of the land 
actually occupied. . . . “83 
In 1923, the British Parliament passed the Devonshire Declaration, in 
which the British Parliament formally declared that the Kenyan colonial 
government regarded itself as exercising a trust on behalf of native Kenyans. 84 The 
British government designated reserved lands as being held in trust due, at least in 
part, to a desire to protect black African interests in the region while reigning in 
European settlers’ attempts at self-government.85 Nevertheless, these developments 
legally established that the Crown, rather than native Kenyans, would be 
responsible for owning land and managing affairs on behalf of native 
populations—the effect of which was to undermine the role of traditional African 
institutions.86 
Concurrent with this diminishment of traditional land ownership rights, 
the early 1920s also witnessed an increased effort by the Kenyan government to 
increase the productivity of native agriculture. The Department of Agriculture’s 
Annual Report for 1920 described the native reserves as being “highly fertile,” and 
stressed that it was “essential” that residents of those reserves “utilize profitably” 
their lands. 87 The 1923 Devonshire Declaration stated Parliament’s intent to 
increase the economic productivity of native Kenyans in order to help them achieve 
a “higher intellectual, moral and economic level.”88 The 1925 Report of the East 
Africa Commission, which summarized the export of crop production in Kenya for 
the years 1921–1924, also emphasized the need to devote more resources to 
increasing agricultural and pastoral output from lands occupied by native Kenyans, 
stressing the potential for a rapid increase in agricultural production within the 
native reserves.89 Finally, in 1927, the Chief Native Commissioner issued a circular 
to all Kenyan administrative officers entitled The Dual Policy of Development that 
demanded better agricultural output within the native reserves in order to meet the 
reserves’ increased food demands.90 By the 1930s, the colonial government had 
established a Ministry of Agriculture to promote market-based agricultural 
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techniques, and a Betterment Fund to finance irrigation projects, administered by 
the Native Lands Trust Board.91 
b. Legislation Impacting Water Usage by Both Colons and Native Kenyans 
In 1921, the Kenyan National Assembly considered but abandoned a new 
draft water ordinance after determining that the cost to implement it would be 
prohibitive.92 In 1926, the Director of Kenya’s Public Works Department, H.L. 
Sires, issued a commissioned report containing recommendations regarding 
Kenya’s future water policy.93 Comparing water laws from a number of European 
countries and former and then-current British colonies, the report determined that a 
reliance on common law riparianism prevented the efficient use of water resources 
because the resulting tenure insecurity inhibited development of the resource.94 As 
a remedy, the report recommended that the Kenyan state claim ownership and 
control over its water resources.95 Also in 1926, A.D. Lewis, the Director of 
Irrigation for South Africa, independently assessed Kenya’s water governance.96 
Like Sires, he also determined that a common law approach was inappropriate for 
the governance of Kenya’s water.97 
At Lewis’ recommendation, Kenya created a Water Legislation 
Committee, which subsequently produced a draft water bill for consideration in 
1928 (the “1928 Draft Water Bill”).98 Among other things, the 1928 Draft Water 
Bill proposed to nationalize ownership of all sources of water, including 
subterranean water, on crown lands.99 In support of the proposed bill, Sires argued 
that the need for a new ordinance had been recognized “for many years by those 
who have been concerned with the administration of existing water law.”100 He 
emphasized that achieving the “maximum beneficial use” of water was a matter of 
“national importance” in light of the fact that Kenya’s water resources were “all too 
scanty and inadequate” for the full development of the country.101 
Strong opposition by white farmers prevented the passage of the 1928 
Draft Water Bill, and Kenya instead passed a weakened water bill in 1929 (the 
“1929 Water Ordinance”).102 The 1929 Water Bill contained no language regarding 
ownership of subterranean waters, but it did provide for state ownership of all 
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surface waters, and delegated its management to the Water Board, a government 
body created expressly for that purpose.103 The 1929 Water Bill retained some 
elements of riparianism in that it allowed for domestic uses of water without the 
need for a permit. Nevertheless, the Bill also tasked the Board with protecting 
downstream users—a role that had previously been reserved for the courts under 
British common law.104 
Kenya’s status as a British colony meant that the 1929 Water Bill required 
the assent of the King before it could take legal effect. In July 1930, however, the 
Secretary of the State informed Kenya’s colonial leaders that he could not 
recommend such assent, voicing concerns that it did not sufficiently protect the 
interests of residents on the native reserves.105 In response to this concern, and 
consistent with the Annexation Order and 1921 Order, in 1934 Kenya’s Lands 
Commission determined that all native reserves would be brought within the 
jurisdiction of the Water Board, which would be considered as the riparian owner 
of those territories and trustee for Africans living on the reserves.106 Based on this 
interpretation, the 1929 Water Bill received the assent of the British Crown and 
entered into effect on July 1, 1935.107 In a corresponding notification in the Kenya 
Gazette, the Kenyan government described the primary object of the 1929 Water 
Bill as being to conserve water and maximize its use.108 The notification also 
observed that, as of June 25, 1935, more than 1,000 water permits had been issued 
(not including yearly permits).109 
4. 1941–1963 
a. Continued Amendment of Water Law to Centralize Governance 
In 1941, six years after the 1929 Water Bill entered into effect, the 
colonial government again felt compelled to address the issue of water use and 
formed the Land and Water Conservation Committee. That Committee was tasked 
with coordinating “in an advisory capacity, with a view to the more effective 
conservation of the water . . . of Kenya, the efforts of the various authorities 
empowered . . . to deal with the natural resources of the Colony and the 
Protectorate.”110 Then, in 1943, the Kenyan government passed the Land and 
Water Preservation Ordinance. While largely concerned with soil erosion and land 
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use, it did allow the Governor in Council to make rules for the maintenance of 
water located within a body of water.111 
After the conclusion of the Second World War, the Kenyan state increased 
its involvement in water governance, including the allocation of £1.2 million over 
ten years towards water development.112 State-sponsored activity on the Native 
Reserves also increased rapidly in the 1950s, after the Agricultural Department 
commissioned a comprehensive Five Year Plan to increase native Kenyans’ 
agricultural productivity.113 Many of these activities involved small-scale 
community projects, in which government-funded dams, boreholes, or wells 
provided irrigation to communities. 
At the same time it increased its role in the development of water 
infrastructure, the colonial government sought to further consolidate its control 
over the resource. Motivated by the desire to facilitate the “investigation, 
conservation, and proper use of water resources,”114 the Kenyan Parliament 
adopted the Water Ordinance in 1951 (the “1951 Water Ordinance”). Whereas the 
1929 Water Ordinance was primarily concerned with the ownership of surface 
water rights and the removal of the court system as the primary arbiter of water 
disputes, the 1951 Water Ordinance, as amended, centralized control over water 
use and designed an entirely new set of institutions to structure and oversee water 
governance and disputes: 
• The Ordinance reaffirmed Crown ownership of all bodies of water in 
Kenya (including groundwater), and the fact that control over those 
resources was vested in the Minister responsible for water resources (the 
“Minister”). Additionally, the Ordinance added an affirmative duty by the 
Minister to “promote the investigation, conservation, and proper use 
throughout Kenya of the water supplies in Kenya, and to secure 
throughout Kenya effective exercise by any authority or person under the 
control of the Minister of their powers and duties in relation to water.” 
• The Ordinance conferred emergency powers on the Minister such that, 
when there was an unforeseen or threatened “serious deficiency” in water 
available for domestic purposes, the Minister could order users with 
excess water to share that excess with other users, and could recover 
payment from the beneficiaries for that provision. 
• The Ordinance established a Water Resources Authority (WRA), which 
consisted of twelve members: one representative of the Minister, an 
officer of the Ministry responsible for local government, four public 
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officers, and six non-public officers. The WRA duties included: (1) 
investigating Kenyan water resources and making recommendations 
regarding its management, (2) surveying existing consumption of and 
demand for water, and (3) estimating and proposing plans to meet future 
water requirements. 
• The Ordinance also established a Water Apportionment Board (WAB), 
which was subordinate to the WRA. One of the powers allocated to the 
WAB was the ability, during a drought or with regard to small 
watercourses, to require that water users allow an equitable amount of 
water to pass to other users or to prohibit certain activities deemed to be 
inequitable (even if doing so overrode a pre-existing permit). 
• The Ordinance also divided Kenya into drainage areas as determined by 
the Water Apportionment Board. The Minister could appoint a Regional 
Water Board (RWB) for each of these drainage areas. The RWBs were 
tasked with advising the WRA regarding water demand, usage, and 
planning in their respective drainage areas.115 
Adopted to implement the 1951 Water Ordinance, the 1953 Water 
(General) Rules116 (the “1953 Water Rules”), as amended, granted the WAB the 
authority to assign a water bailiff to govern extraction from a body of water when it 
appeared that the water was not being or was not likely to be divided in accordance 
with the rights of the users. Water bailiffs were authorized to apportion and 
regulate the usage of water, and also to shut or regulate any works used in 
connection with that water. The 1953 Water Rules also expressly prohibited the 
extraction of more water than could be immediately put to beneficial use. 
Regarding state sponsored projects in the native reserves, the colonial 
government generally allowed native Kenyans to allocate water amongst users 
according to traditional practices.117 Nevertheless, residents of the native reserves 
were still expected to comply with Kenya’s newly enacted water laws. Further, the 
1953 Water Rules required residents of native reserves to obtain “Community 
(Reserve Areas) Permits” in order to legally extract water located on or running 
through the reserves.118 Form No. W.A.B. 13, appended to the 1951 Water 
Ordinance, limited permits for domestic water extraction for Africans (as opposed 
to Europeans or Asians) to ten gallons/day (a rate that was five times less than that 
allocated to non-Africans). 
In 1955, the East Africa Royal Commission promulgated a report (the 
“EARC Report”) that recommended actions designed to facilitate/address a wide 
range of goals and perceived problems in the East African region.119 With regards 
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to water development, the EARC Report recommendations proposed the creation 
of a separate water department, entirely devoted to rural water use, which would be 
responsible to the Minister concerned with land use for rural water development.120 
This proposed water department was to be divided into two sections: one devoted 
exclusively to irrigation and the other to general water usage.121 In a response to the 
EARC Report, the Governor of Kenya wrote that the implementation of this 
recommendation would be deferred for further consideration.122 
By the time Kenya gained its independence, the central government had 
assumed control over almost all of rural water management.123 While the native 
reserves were still allowed to govern their internal water usage, this ability was—at 
least from a de jure standpoint—constrained by the requirement that the reserves as 
a whole had to obtain community permits. And, given the incredibly low amount of 
water granted for native Kenyans, as opposed to their non-African counterparts, the 
governance may have consisted of little more than distributive triage. 
b. Creation of Large-Scale Irrigation Schemes 
At the same time that the colonial government was consolidating its legal 
control over agricultural water use, it also extended its reach by creating large-scale 
irrigation schemes. After the end of World War II, the colonial government began 
resettling native Kenyans, at times involuntarily, to serve as tenant farmers on 
government run agricultural development projects. These projects controlled nearly 
all agricultural decisions of their tenants. Managers appointed by the colonial 
government determined what crops would be grown, how they would be grown, 
and where they would be sold.124 With decision-making completely centralized, 
tenants had little to no capacity to adapt their behaviors to respond to changes in 
market or meteorological conditions.125 
The creation of the agricultural projects was driven primarily by three 
interrelated concerns: soil depletion and erosion resulting from improper farming 
practices, increasing rural populations, and the desire to increase the government’s 
control over residents deemed to be a threat to Kenya’s stability. Colons and the 
state claimed large swaths of land, which, together with an increase in the 
population of rural black Kenyans, placed demands on land use that disrupted the 
traditional practice of periodically fallowing land.126 The decrease in fallowing led, 
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late 1930’s administrators throughout Africa recognized soil infertility and erosion 
as serious problems, and population resettlement as a potential solution.128 In 1938, 
for example, concern over the infertile soils of land occupied by the Mbere tribe led 
one official to write that the tribe’s only hope for economic success was 
resettlement to better lands.129 
With the cessation of hostilities at the end of World War II, the United 
Kingdom significantly increasing funding for colonial development, resulting in 
renewed interest in resettlement schemes in the late 1940’s.130 Chambers writes, 
“European settlement had reduced the land available for African use, exacerbating 
overpopulation problems and at the same time creating a political situation in 
which African expansion was regarded as a threat to security. . . . Irrigation in 
Kenya was . . . designed to have a stabilizing effect.”131 The 1952 Mau Mau 
rebellion led the colonial state to forcibly relocate large numbers of Kikuyu tribe 
members who previously had lived in the European Settled Area onto the 
designated Kikuyu land.132 Kikuyu detainees were used to construct three large 
irrigation settlements.133 Mwea was one of them, and was also Kenya’s largest 
irrigation scheme. Kikuyu detainees considered to be security risks were settled 
there.134 
The irrigation schemes initially were administered through a relatively 
loose coalition of governmental agencies. By 1954, a Joint Irrigation Committee 
was created to facilitate national level coordination, while local committees 
operated at the scheme level.135 But “[t]hese were not statutory bodies, and their 
effectiveness . . . depended to a considerable extent on the personalities and co-
operation of those who took part.”136 In 1960, the Ministry of Agriculture assumed 
primary responsibility for operating the schemes.137 Nevertheless, and despite the 
uniformity of formal policies and statutes, in practice the schemes’ managers 
operated with a large degree of autonomy in implementing and interpreting each 
scheme’s irrigation rules, with little meaningful input from the schemes’ tenant 
farmers.138 
C. Post-Colonial Continuation of Centralized Water Governance (1963–1982) 
Kenya’s independence coincided with significant changes in land use and 
distribution. In preparation for the country’s independence, the colonial 
government began purchasing lands from departing colons to be resold to a select 
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group of relatively affluent black Kenyans.139 But, largely because of the marginal 
suitability of much of the land purchased through this program (which, in turn, 
failed to attract the desired “progressive” black farmers) and concerns over the 
growing size of the black landless population, the government ultimately 
abandoned its plan for low density resettlement.140 Instead, the colonial 
government used the so-called Million-Acre Scheme to redistribute approximately 
1.2 million acres of large-scale land holdings to around 35,000 families for 
smallholder use.141 In the decades following Kenyan independence, the country 
experienced a continued increase in population and intensification in agricultural 
activity.142 
Despite changes in land use as well as population density and distribution, 
the post-independence regime largely continued the water governance approach of 
its colonial predecessors. Kenya amended the 1951 Water Ordinance in 1963 and 
1972, but the revisions were minimal.143 The amendments added Catchment 
Boards (tasked with advising the WAB regarding water apportionment and 
permitting in designated water catchments) and changed the names of Regional 
Water Boards144 to “Regional Water Committees.” The amendments also afforded 
these Committees slightly broader, though still purely advisory, influence on the 
Water Resources Authority. The 1972 Amendment appointed water bailiffs to issue 
permits and monitor and sanction water usage. However, water permits still 
required centralized approval. Thus, the practical effect of the 1972 amendment 
was to require landholders to obtain both local and national approval to acquire a 
water use permit.145 
Kenya established a National Irrigation Board (NIB) in 1966, which was 
tasked with the development, control, and improvement of large irrigation 
settlements.146 The NIB annually allocated water to the schemes, while the precise 
irrigation schedules for different water conditions were determined by scheme 
managers.147 Despite the strict hierarchical system of decision making, and the 
presence of formal institutions designed to sanction violations and resolve disputes, 
many such mechanisms existed on paper only, and the schemes’ managers often 
failed to adequately monitor water use, sanction violators, or resolve tenants’ water 
conflicts, leading to widespread discontent.148 
In 1974, Kenya adopted a National Water Master Plan (the “Master 
Plan”), which set a target of making potable water available to all households in 
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Kenya by 2000.149 That same year, the Kenyan Parliament created the Ministry in 
Charge of Water Affairs (the “Water Ministry”).150 In addition to taking over the 
management of governmental water schemes, the Water Ministry assumed control 
over self-help and County Council schemes.151 Decisions regarding water 
management were to be made at the national level, with local agencies primarily 
serving in an advisory capacity.152 In fact, the agencies at the catchment and district 
levels lacked the needed resources to address all water governance issues that arose 
at their respective levels.153 For instance, while they were supposed to be the 
ground-level institutions responsible for permit issuance and enforcement, the 
water bailiffs were so chronically underfunded that they often lacked the 
transportation and other resources necessary to effectively undertake those 
responsibilities.154 And, while local populations may have adopted their own, more 
effective governance institutions, they would have been adopted in an ad hoc 
fashion, outside the formal, centralized system of governance. Throughout this time 
period, illegal water extraction was commonplace.155 
From 1976 to 1981, Kenya conducted an analysis of the National Water 
Master Plan.156 Among other things, that study (along with a later study conducted 
from 1990–1992) highlighted the fact that Kenya lacked the financial resources to 
achieve the Master Plan’s goals.157 This financial shortcoming particularly 
hamstrung the Water Ministry’s ability to operate and maintain the water service 
infrastructure under its control.158 Importantly, the Water Ministry could not 
properly monitor water users for compliance with water regulations.159 As already 
noted, water bailiffs (who were tasked with monitoring and enforcing compliance) 
often lacked the resources necessary to even issue water permits, let alone ensure 
their monitoring and enforcement.160 Compounding this shortcoming was the fact 
that the unwieldy permitting process meant that the issuance of permits could take 
several years.161 This combination of delayed permit issuance and ineffectual 
monitoring and enforcement meant that, in practice, water users frequently engaged 
in illegal extraction.162 
Other weaknesses identified by the studies included an “over-centralized 
decision making process” and the absence of specialized courts or tribunals to hear 
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water conflicts.163 Further, and most ironically, Kenya’s water laws were 
recognized as themselves impeding effective water governance in Kenya. In 
addition to the Water Act, twenty-six other statutes impacted water use, greatly 
complicating water governance.164 Moreover, penalties for noncompliance, 
including illegal extraction, were insufficient to deter violators.165 The analyses 
found that the Water Act provided little guidance on how to address conflicts 
between water users.166 Those conflicts included disputes between different types 
of water users (such as agricultural or industrial), between users situated in 
different districts, and, most commonly, between downstream and upstream 
users.167 
Two widely reported examples of conflicts between upstream and 
downstream users occurred in 2000. In the first, which occurred in late February of 
that year, residents of a village (including the council chairman) barricaded the 
Nyeri-Nyahurur highway for half a day complaining that illegal over-extraction by 
upstream irrigators had prevented them from receiving any water for several 
months. They demanded an audience with the area District Commissioner and 
rioted when police arrived to disperse them. In the second incident, a few weeks 
later, a fish farmer complained that he had lost 30,000 trout in his fish farm (worth 
an estimated US$53,000) after upstream irrigators illegally diverted the Likii River. 
The fish farmer threatened to take “other measures” unless the authorities 
investigated and punished the illegal extractors.168 There were also numerous, and 
less widely reported, forms of conflicts between upstream and downstream users, 
particularly during the country’s episodic droughts. Baldwin et al. note that, faced 
with an absence of legal mechanisms for redress, downstream users “would often 
tamper with upstream users’ diversions or resort to other illicit forms of 
retaliation.”169 
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D. The Start of Decentralization of Water Management (1983–2002) 
The threat of scarcity-induced water conflicts, combined with a loss of 
governmental resources resulting from economic recession,170 led to local and 
national initiatives to re-involve local communities in various aspects of water 
management. The first of these initiatives began in 1983, with the adoption of the 
District Focus for Rural Development policy (the “District Focus” policy), by 
which the central Kenyan state sought to “hand over” some drinking water services 
to non-governmental entities.171 Consequently, the Ministry of Water Development 
emphasized the need to facilitate the formation of community-based “self-help” 
groups to initiate water projects.172 
In the early 1990’s, a network consisting of the Swiss-funded Laikipia 
Research Programme,173 the Natural Resources Management Trust, and six Kenyan 
government ministries initiated the Water Awareness Creation Campaign. This 
Campaign was aimed at water stakeholders in the Upper Ewaso Ng’iro Basin, a 
lowland catchment area to the northwest of Mount Kenya that encompasses 
approximately 37 percent of Kenya’s land area.174 In 1997, shortly after the 
conclusion of that campaign, and based on recommendations it generated, water 
users adapted an existing self-help group to form the first Water User Association 
(WUA). Designed to coordinate the management of water resources, mitigate 
conflicts among stakeholders, and facilitate community water projects, another four 
WUAs emerged by 2001.175 
In 1999, The Water Ministry proposed to address the Water Act’s 
shortcomings (as identified in the two National Water Master Plan analyses) by 
taking the following actions (among others): 
• Plan and manage water resources on a drainage (rather than an 
administrative) basis, creating agencies at the national, basin, and sub-
basin levels;176 
• Ensure that water legislation is regularly “reviewed, updated, rationalized, 
enacted and enforced as appropriate;”177 and 
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• Redefine the role of the central government in water governance to 
emphasize “regulatory and enabling” functions, rather than direct service 
provisions, and the support of private sector and community participation 
in water service provision.178 
E. Polycentric Water Management (2002–Present) 
Kenya revised the Water Act in 2002. In a stark departure from the 
previous colonial-style approach, and consistent with the suggestions made by the 
Water Ministry three years earlier, the new Water Act establishes regional-level 
authorities and devolves meaningful responsibilities to them. The Act created a 
Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) tasked with, among other 
things, developing principles and procedures for allocating water resources, 
monitoring and assessing national water management strategy, and granting 
applications for water permits and monitoring compliance with their terms.179 The 
Water Act granted WRMA the legal capacity (subject to the consent of the 
Attorney-General) to prosecute offenses arising under the Water Act.180 The 2002 
Water Rules, promulgated pursuant to the Water Act, allowed WRMA to issue 
orders requiring the cessation or undertaking of activities to ensure compliance 
with the rules.181 Failure to comply with such an order can result in the imposition 
of some combination of a 50,000 shilling fine, up to three months imprisonment, 
and the suspension, alteration or cancellation of a water permit.182 
While the Act requires the Minister to formulate a national water 
management strategy,183 WRMA is tasked with formulating strategies for the use 
and management of water within designated catchment areas.184 For each 
catchment area, an appointed catchment area advisory committee advises WRMA 
about water usage, management, and the issuance or cancellation of water 
permits.185 These committees are comprised of public officials, farmers or 
pastoralists, the business community, relevant non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), or others selected by WRMA based on their apparent competence in the 
management of water resources.186 
The Water Act mandates that WRMA “encourage and facilitate” the 
establishment of WUAs, which the Act refers to by the alternate name of Water 
Resources Users Associations (WRUAs).187 In order for a WRUA to be recognized 
by WRMA under the Water Act, it must be legally registered and have a 
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constitution “conducive to collaborative management of the water resources of a 
particular resource and which promotes public participation, conflict mitigation, 
gender main-streaming and environmental sustainability.”188 Once a WRUA is 
recognized, WRMA is permitted to enter into a memorandum of understanding 
with it to allow for collaborative management of water.189 Even if no memorandum 
of understanding is reached, however, the Water Act requires WRMA to submit a 
copy of every water use application to a relevant registered WRUA for 
comment.190 
The WRUAs are tasked with preventing and resolving user conflicts.191 
To that end, they must include all stakeholders within a catchment area and permit 
them to participate in decision making.192 The legal recognition of a WRUA allows 
it to assume formal governance functions such as monitoring and enforcement of 
permits and the implementation of water conservation programs.193 Critically, 
WRUAs are also responsible for crafting water-rationing schedules to equitably 
distribute water amongst users during times of scarcity.194 While WRMA cedes 
much operational control to the WRUAs, it and other government agencies are 
available as needed to assist with issues of monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict 
resolution.195 
Facially, the new Water Act also appears to increase the jurisdiction of a 
Water Appeal Board first established in 1957. In addition to allowing people to 
appeal the decisions of WRMA, the Water Appeal Board is also empowered to hear 
and determine water disputes.196 However, recent decisions by the Kenyan High 
Court have held that the “additional jurisdiction granted to the Water Appeals (sic) 
Board is in fact limited,” and is restricted to disputes regarding a “right or 
proprietary interest which is directly affected by a decision or order . . . concerning 
a permit or license.”197 Finally, the new Water Act also significantly increased the 
penalties associated with violations of the Water Act.198 Whereas the previous 
monetary penalty for violations was 5,000 shillings or imprisonment for up to three 
months (for default of payment), the new penalty was 100,000 shillings, 
imprisonment for up one year, or both.199 
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution. The constitution generally 
calls for the recognition of the “right of communities to manage their own affairs 
and to further their development.”200 More specifically, the constitution states that 
each county should have its own government, and that each of these county 
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governments “shall decentralize its functions and the provision of its services to the 
extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so.”201 
F. Calls for Further Decentralization 
Despite the sweeping changes instituted by the 2002 Water Act, Kenya 
continues to grapple with how to best match its water governance approach to its 
climatic and socioeconomic realities. Policymakers have recently considered—and 
rejected—two draft policies that would have further devolved water governance to 
regional and local decision-makers. 
The Ministry for Water and Irrigation generated a draft National Water 
Policy in 2012. While noting that the 2002 Water Act had facilitated greater levels 
of water user participation in the form of WRAs and Water Association Groups 
(WAGs), the draft policy also identified as a problem the incomplete devolution of 
functions to the basin level.202 The draft policy stated that one of the guiding 
policies for water resources management was that of participatory management 
approaches, with the goal of facilitating conflict resolution and optimal use of the 
resources.203 Similarly, from an institutional design standpoint, the draft policy 
articulated the devolution of governmental functions to the lowest possible level as 
a guiding principle.204 
In light of the 2010 Constitution, the draft policy called for the creation of 
a new Water Act.205 The draft policy emphasized the participatory rights enshrined 
in the Constitution, and thus stated that the right to be informed about the status of 
water management needed to be institutionalized.206 The draft policy theorizes that 
such a change will help to peacefully resolve future water conflicts.207 
The Kenyan Parliament considered a new draft Water Bill in both 2012 
and 2014. Both drafts would have changed the language identifying water 
resources as property of the state, instead describing water as being “vested in and 
held by the national government in trust for the people of Kenya.”208 Both drafts 
also would have established Water Sector Trust Funds to support community-level 
sustainable water management initiatives.209 Both draft bills would have provided 
for the designation of “basin areas,” defined as a “defined area from which 
rainwater flows into a watercourse,”210 and created a basin-level management 
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board or committee.211 However, the 2012 and 2014 draft bills, differed in how the 
basic board or committee would be appointed. The 2012 draft bill envisioned the 
board chairman and members being appointed by the cabinet secretary, in a 
competitive recruitment process, from among constituents residing within the 
relevant basin.212 The 2014 draft called for the committee to consist of between 
four and seven members appointed by the Secretary, plus two members appointed 
by a Council of Governors representing the counties falling within the basin, with 
the Council selecting representatives from those counties on a rotating basis.213 
Additionally, the members selected by the Secretary would have had to be residents 
from the basin area, and would have included representatives from (a) a ministry 
dealing with water, (b) farmers or pastoralists within the basin, (c) a public benefits 
organization engaged in water management within the basin area, and (d) the 
business community.214 
Both draft bills called for the basin water boards to help to ensure 
equitable water sharing through water allocation plans,215 but the 2012 version 
would have provided the boards with significantly more power. In the 2012 
version, the water boards were to receive and make decisions regarding water 
permit applications, whereas in the 2014 version, the role of the board is simply to 
advise the WRMA regarding such applications.216 Similarly, while both versions 
call for the boards to protect water resources, only the 2012 version tasked the 
boards with enforcing water regulations.217 The 2012 Draft Water Bill would have 
added as one of the WRMA’s express functions the delegation of regulatory 
functions to Basin Water Resources Board (the 2014 Draft Water Bill did not 
contain such a requirement).218 
The draft bills also would have significantly modified how violations of 
and disputes under the Water Act are addressed. First, the drafts would have further 
reduced the role of the court system for resolving disputes over water resources. In 
an apparent response to the High Court’s interpretation of the jurisdiction of the 
WRMA dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., that WRMA could only resolve cases 
regarding rights under the Water Act, but not commercial disputes or other 
conflicts), both drafts would have created a new Water Tribunal authorized to hear 
“any dispute concerning water resources or water services where there is a business 
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contract, unless the parties have otherwise agreed to an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism.”219 
Second, the drafts would have decentralized prosecution of water 
offenses, and greatly increased the penalties associated with criminal violations of 
the Water Act. The 2002 Water Act provides that the Minister, the WRMA, or the 
Regulatory Board can initiate criminal proceedings.220 Both the 2012 and 2014 
draft bills would have authorized licensees under the Act to initiate criminal 
proceedings, and the 2014 draft bill would additionally have granted the same 
authority to county government executives.221 Both versions would have increased 
the penalties for offenses up to one million shillings, two years of imprisonment, or 
both (compared with up to 100,000 shillings and one year of imprisonment under 
the 2002 Water Act).222 
IV. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
The history of Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial water law represents an 
ongoing struggle to match the country’s laws and other institutions to its 
socioeconomic and environmental realities. In this section, we discuss the poor fit 
of both the common law riparian doctrine and the centralized approach to water 
governance in Kenya. We also discuss efforts by stakeholders to work around these 
ill-suited rules and institutions through the creation of WUAs and how, through 
their efforts, those users were able to help fundamentally alter the constitutional 
rules affecting water extraction throughout Kenya. Finally, we discuss lessons 
learned from Kenya’s experience that might be more broadly applicable to resource 
governance elsewhere. 
A. The Failure of the Riparian Doctrine 
British colonists initially imported a governance approach that had 
evolved to address a very different climate and society. In the United Kingdom, 
where annual water flows hardly fluctuated and riparian owners had relatively 
equal standing under the law, water governance could reasonably rely on the 
judicial system to address water conflicts through the fashioning of ex post 
monetary remedies and injunctions. The approach was ill-suited, however, to a 
country that experienced extreme differences in precipitation between its wet and 
dry seasons, lacked the resources to provide easy access to and enforcement of 
judicial rulings, and had a legal system that advantaged a minority of its population 
at the expense of the majority. 
The ability of users under the riparian doctrine to extract nearly unlimited 
amounts of water —constrained only by the requirements that the use is “ordinary” 
and does not materially affect the quantity or quality of water available to 
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downstream users—relies on a core assumption that demand for water will 
ordinarily not exceed availability. In order for users’ “normal” use of water to not 
materially impact the whole of the remaining downstream users, the water supply 
must be relatively abundant compared to aggregated demand. This scenario 
occurred in the United Kingdom, where almost the entirety of the region receives 
more than 600 millimeters (mm) of rain per year and where some areas receive in 
annual rainfall in excess of 3,000 mm.223 Kenya, however, experiences an extreme 
range of rainfall levels. Its coastal region averages between 660 and 1,194 mm/year 
of rainfall, and areas near Lake Victoria receive as much as 1,930 mm/year.224 On 
the other hand, 72 percent of the country receives below 508 mm of rain per year, 
including some areas that receive as little as 165 mm/year.225 Thus, the assumption 
of abundant water supply is simply not applicable to the vast majority of Kenya. 
A second underlying assumption of the riparian doctrine is that the supply 
of water will be relatively constant, such that ex post remedies are sufficient to 
address disputes. In other words, the common law approach assumes little need for 
flexibility in extraction rights to prospectively or concurrently address water 
conflicts. Again, this fits conditions in the United Kingdom, but not Kenya. While 
the United Kingdom does experience some seasonal differences in rainfall, that 
difference is relatively small. Consider, for instance, the city of Oxford, which has 
been operating a weather station since 1853. From that date through 2014, Oxford 
received an average monthly rainfall of 60 mm, with the wettest month 
(November) averaging 64mm of precipitation and the driest (February) averaging 
43 mm.226 
In Kenya, on the other hand, almost the entirety of rainfall occurs during 
two rainy seasons (from March to May and October to December, respectively), 
and even those seasons vary in their duration and rainfall levels.227 Obiero and 
Onyando note, for example, that Kisumu receives a mean annual rainfall of 1,278 
mm from an average of only 139 rainy days, while Lodwar experiences an annual 
average of only twenty-three rainy days, resulting in a mean annual rainfall of 165 
mm.228 Conditions such as those found in Kenya require flexible governance 
approaches that can adapt to extreme differences in water availability, from flood 
conditions to prolonged drought. The reliance on ex post remedies requires riparian 
users to constantly return to the courts for redress and provides no assurance as to 
the future availability of water. 
Finally, the riparian doctrine is conditioned on the fact that all water users 
have equal access to courts and equal standing under the law. First written in 1886, 
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A.V. Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution remarked that 
the “rule of law” in England was characterized by the fact that: 
every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the 
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals. In England, the idea of legal equality, or of the 
universal subjection of all classes to one law administered by the 
ordinary Courts, has been pushed to its utmost limit.229 
Thus, at least in theory, all English landowners could expect to easily seek 
redress for harm caused by upstream users, regardless of their own status and the 
status of upstream extractors. Kenya, however, was marked by two clear legal 
classes of riparian ownership and, hence, water users. The white colons possessed 
the full ownership rights and access to the judicial system contemplated by the 
riparian doctrine. Native Kenyans, on the other hand, were stripped of individual 
ownership rights; ownership was held in trust by the Kenyan state. In order to seek 
redress, native water users had to ask the government to seek action on their behalf. 
Before 1935, when the Water Board was tasked with protecting the reserves’ water 
rights, it was unclear to which entity within the colonial government native 
Kenyans could turn to for redress. Even after 1935, it is likely that residents of the 
native reserves faced significant economic, logistical, and administrative hurdles to 
seeking the resolution of water disputes—if they were even aware of the Water 
Board’s fiduciary obligations. In short, while white colons might possess the 
relative legal equality required by the riparian doctrine, the diminished legal rights 
of native Kenyans meant that, for all intents and purposes, the doctrine provided 
them with little or no protection. 
B. The Failure of Centralized Governance 
By consolidating and centralizing water governance, the colonial and post-
colonial governments sought to address the riparian doctrine’s glaring 
shortcomings. Rather than allowing the ambiguous “ordinary use” of water, so long 
as that use did not interfere with the rights of downstream users, the governments 
sought to restrict water use at the individual level through the issuance of permits. 
In place of ex post judicial remedies, the state sought to ensure individual 
compliance by sanctioning permit violators. The governments attempted to address 
fluctuations in water availability by authorizing water bailiffs to amend permissible 
rates of extraction in order to ensure an equitable distribution of water resources. 
The reliance on permits, however, had several fundamental flaws. First, a 
centralized permitting system is highly resource intensive. In order to implement a 
successful monocentric system such as the one implemented in Kenya, the state 
must: (1) investigate the reasonableness of a permit application by assessing the 
geological and climatic conditions of the water resource at issue, including the 
existing and future demands on that resource from other users, (2) engage in 
ongoing monitoring of resource users to ensure compliance with permits and take 
measures to punish violators, and (3) undertake an ongoing assessment of water 
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conditions and extraction in order to determine whether to amend the permit 
holders’ respective rates of extraction. The combination of these responsibilities 
demanded manpower and money that neither the colonial nor post-independence 
governments possessed. 
Second, by legally establishing invariable extraction entitlements (subject 
only to the possibility of emergency alteration by a central authority), the permit 
system retarded the capacity of local users to engage in local collective action to 
address changes in water availability or constructively resolve user disputes. 
Upstream users were legally entitled to extract their full permitted amount, even in 
times of scarcity. Downstream users had no legal avenues that could provide timely 
redress during water scarcity, and the permit program that ought to have protected 
their interests was in disarray, as state officials lacked the resources to effectively 
enforce permit terms.230 As a consequence, downstream users often suffered 
chronic water shortages and resorted to self-help measures ranging from peaceful 
self-organization to mass protests, riots, and sabotage. 
Third, Kenya’s use of a centralized permitting system precluded the state 
from accounting for local needs and conditions. Kenya experiences extreme 
seasonal and year-to-year fluctuations in precipitation, and its water stakeholders 
range from large, commercial agricultural estates to nomadic pastoralists. Thus, 
each water catchment in Kenya has its own unique assortment of users with their 
own particular needs, and both these users and their respective needs can differ 
from season to season and from year to year. Kenya’s system of permitting simply 
lacked the flexibility to account for this sort of variation between and within user 
groups. 
In sum, the use of water permits resulted in an unwieldy system that 
lacked the ability to gauge the appropriateness of permit requests, ensure permit 
compliance, resolve disputes arising from conflicting permits, or respond in a 
timely fashion to changes in demand or environmental conditions. These were not 
lacunae, but rather gaping holes in a system that facilitated extractions by mostly 
white upstream landowners and greatly diminished the ability of the largely black 
downstream users to meet their own needs. The inequities in the system, in turn, 
incentivized disadvantaged stakeholders to engage in extra-legal self-help 
measures. 
C.  The Polycentric Reshaping of Water Law to Allow for Flexible 
Governance and Experimentation 
While the poor fit between a monocentric approach and Kenya’s 
geographic, political, economic conditions led to the failure of centralized water 
governance, that same mismatch also provided the opening for localized 
stakeholders to experiment with more appropriate governance arrangements. These 
early experiments were facilitated, in turn, by government agencies, which had a 
similar interest in fashioning a more effective governance system. Early efforts to 
reform Kenya’s centralized system of water governance came from local 
stakeholders interacting with and supported by a number of other players with 
varying and overlapping goals and jurisdictions. 
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The WUAs were a direct result of those early local reform efforts. From a 
formal legal standpoint, they were merely voluntary governance associations, but 
the WUAs gained the tacit support of multiple government agencies so that they 
could make their own local governance arrangements unimpeded. As a result, the 
WUAs became a viable alternative water governance system that overlapped and 
worked in concert with the state’s formal rules and institutions. In other words, 
they represented the beginning of a new, polycentric approach to water governance. 
Critical to the success of the WUAs was the fact that all stakeholders had 
at least a potential interest in tailoring water governance to local conditions. Under 
the monocentric approach, upstream users often had the de facto ability to extract 
as much water as they desired. But, this ability could come with political costs, 
including the risk of provoking aggressive responses from downstream users, who 
correctly surmised that the government could not adequately protect their interests. 
As a consequence, both upstream and downstream users faced incentives to craft a 
system of governance that would protect all users’ interests.231 
In practice, the early WUAs demonstrated the capacity to adopt, monitor, 
enforce, and mediate a much more flexible set of rules than those set out in existing 
legislation. In 2002, the same year that the revised Water Act institutionalized the 
WUA approach, Kiteme and Gikonyo reviewed the performance of five preexisting 
WUAs located in the Ewaso Ngiro North Basin.232 The authors found that the 
WUAs had adopted a seasonally-based extraction schedule, with varying degrees 
of limitations on water extraction during the dry months.233 Additionally, while the 
WUAs generally met on a quarterly basis, they would also conduct special 
meetings if events required immediate attention.234 Unlike under the monocentric 
approach, the WUAs used their own monitors to ensure compliance with water 
extraction rules, and the WUAs’ Executive Boards (composed of representatives 
from various stakeholder groups) would attempt to mediate and collaboratively 
resolve the inevitable user conflicts.235 These arrangements sharply contrasted the 
formal legal system’s reliance on fixed extraction levels (amended only after 
inequitable circumstances necessitated the appointment of a water bailiff) and 
centralized monitoring and enforcement of water of water permits. 
The success of these early WUAs in experimenting with more flexible 
local water policies led to the expansion of their roles, in some cases, to include 
other aspects of resource management.236 In addition to governing water extraction, 
WUAs began addressing concerns regarding water pollution and riparian 
degradation by engaging in education and awareness campaigns, undertaking 
reforestation of riparian areas, and introducing agricultural best practices.237 Some 
of the WUAs also started assisting their members in other ways, such as helping 
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them to develop supplemental water supplies or diversify their income sources.238 
Kiteme and Gikonyo suggest that some of these developments may have been the 
result of communication and information exchange between various WUAs.239 
Thus, it appears that this early network of WUAs realized in practice the potential 
of polycentric systems to facilitate the rapid adoption sharing of successful 
innovations amongst horizontally situated decision centers. 
Innovation swapping also occurred between vertically situated governance 
units, as the WUAs’ successful innovations ultimately led to an amendment of the 
entire national approach to water governance in the 2002 Water Act. That statute 
formally recognized the legitimacy of the WUAs (now described as WRUAs), and 
sought to facilitate that approach throughout the rest of Kenya. By now, more than 
400 WRUAs have been formally recognized, and more than half of those have 
formalized management plans with the WRMA, which allow them to 
collaboratively manage water resources.240 In this respect, we can see how a 
polycentric system of governance can allow for local experimentation that, if 
successful, can be scaled up and, if unsuccessful, does not threaten the integrity of 
the system as a whole. 
In this discussion of polycentricity, it is important to distinguish between 
polycentric and decentralized systems. While Kenya’s water reforms devolved 
significant decision-making authority from central water agency officials to local 
WRUAs, this does not imply complete decentralization or an absence of national 
authority. In fact, national water regulators are responsible for establishing 
national-scale water policy, coordinating between WRUAs, working with 
individual WRUAs on water conservation activities, and providing back-up 
systems for governance functions such as monitoring and conflict resolution on an 
as-needed basis when the WRUAs are unable to undertake these activities on their 
own. Polycentric systems are both horizontal (allowing local WRUAs to undertake 
water governance activities) and vertical (providing for coordination between local 
and national actors). 
D. Lessons from the Kenyan Experience 
Given the particularized climatic, racial, and socio-economic challenges 
faced by its agriculture, what broader lessons can be drawn from Kenya’s 
experimentations in water governance? More than might, at first blush, be 
supposed. 
First, water scarcity and seasonal variation in water availability are not 
unique to Kenya. Countries throughout the developed and developing worlds must 
contend with competition over water supplies. Further, the intensity and nature of 
that competition is likely to vary across seasons and geographic regions within 
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those countries. Therefore, states must adopt a governance approach that provides 
the adaptability and responsiveness to balance the competing (and changing) needs 
of water users and to timely address inevitable user disputes. Monolithic 
governance regimes are likely to lack the capacity to provide this sort of flexibility 
and alacrity. A polycentric system of governance, on the other hand, allows for 
more local decision-making, the possibility of innovation tailored to local 
conditions, and more rapid responses to changing local conditions. 
Second, despite its chaotic appearance, polycentricity can actually 
facilitate effective governance by allowing for coordination and knowledge 
exchange between different units and layers of governance.241 Policymakers in a 
centralized governance system often have difficulty gathering information that 
would allow for the generation of policies suited to a diversity of regional needs.242 
They are reliant on the timely provision of information from regional and local 
agencies and, therefore, vulnerable to both inefficiencies in the exchange of 
information and the strategic manipulation of information by local and regional 
actors. In contrast, a polycentric system of governance allows for more rapid 
exchange of ideas and adoption of successful innovations. 
Network theory provides an important insight into the capacity of 
polycentric systems to facilitate this type of knowledge exchange. The overlap in 
jurisdiction amongst decision-making centers in a polycentric system allows the 
centers to directly influence each other, and for individual actors to be 
simultaneously involved in multiple centers.243 Consequently, decision centers in a 
polycentric regime are linked together via mutual influence and commonality of 
actors into a broader governance network.244 
In discussing the impact of networking among firms, Mahmood and Rufin 
observe that knowledge “spills over” organizational boundaries.245 They write, 
[a] growing body of research on networks suggests that the 
potential for firms to internalize such cross-boundary spillovers is 
particularly high within networks. . . . Within a cluster [of firms], 
exchanges of ideas among firms may occur through formal ties or 
through informal ties, since individuals from different firms often 
interact in various social settings. . . . Networks provide multiple 
points of contact across their members and, thus, greater 
opportunities for open-ended relationships and random learning 
than those found in strictly planned environments, where 
relationships are much more rigidly predefined and 
circumscribed to a specific type of exchange.246 
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Given the frequent interactions amongst decision centers in a polycentric 
regime, and the potential involvement of actors in multiple centers, Mahmood and 
Rufin’s observations about the advantages of networks to firms would appear to be 
equally applicable to state governance. All else being equal, we would expect more 
opportunities for learning and the adoption of innovation in a polycentric system of 
governance than we would in a rigidly hierarchical governance system. 
Third, a polycentric system of governance is better equipped to recognize 
and incorporate local, informal institutions. Nations in all stages of development, 
and of all degrees of centralization, have a plenitude of informal institutions that 
contribute to governance and the provision of public goods, including issues 
involving agricultural water use. The global marketplace, for example, is rife with 
voluntary certification programs through which sellers signal eco-friendly 
practices. In the United States, the Food Alliance, for example, offers a 
sustainability certification to crop producers that meet the organization’s standards 
on a number of issues, including soil and water conservation.247 After the issuance 
of the certification, the organization reserves the right to audit certificate holders to 
ensure continued compliance.248 In this way, the Food Alliance informally 
performs a governance role amongst those who have obtained certification. 
In many developing countries, the limitations of the central state often 
result in the development of informal institutions by local communities to more 
expressly assume governmental responsibilities. Communities can and frequently 
do create and enforce their own resource extraction rules. In addition to the 
WRUAs in Kenya, for example, traditional authorities in some areas of Namibia 
retained a role in granting access to water and regulating its use throughout a 
succession of colonial governments.249 Similarly, despite the fact that agricultural 
systems in India are formally government controlled, in reality “informal 
institutional arrangements rul[e] the roost.”250 
A polycentric governance approach provides a greater opportunity for the 
integration of these informal institutions into the broader governance system. In 
this way, rather than operating in the absence of or in spite of the formal governing 
hierarchy, organizations created by informal institutions can become part of the 
network of overlapping decision centers in a broader polity. As a consequence, a 
polycentric governance system has the potential to improve both efficiency (as 
might be the case where industry voluntarily self-regulates) and effectiveness, as in 
the case of Kenya’s WRUAs. 
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